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NOTE
WHY DO BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD PEOPLE? AN
EXAMINATION OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AND
THEIR ROLE IN SENTENCING
John B. Riordan†
ABSTRACT
As everyone knows, when a person is convicted of a crime, that person is
sentenced by the court. Sentencing can range from a simple fine, to
community service, to incarceration. What many people do not know,
however, is that sentences imposed by courts are not the only consequences
of conviction. Indeed, even for those wrongdoings that people may
commonly describe as “mild,” a plethora of “extra” or “collateral”
consequences attach at the time of conviction. These collateral
consequences, and their purpose, are the subject of this Note.
The main concern with collateral consequences is their place in the
sentencing process. Should courts consider these ancillary penalties when
forming a sentence that is supposed to be proportional to the crime? The
Eastern District of New York answered this question with a resounding
“yes” in United States v. Nesbeth. In that case, the court was to render a
judgment and sentence on a first-time offender who was caught importing
cocaine. After reviewing the defendant’s history and character, the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case, and a list of collateral consequences
that would follow the defendant forever, the court imposed a sentence far
lower than usual. In justifying its decision to step outside of the sentencing
guidelines, the court noted the myriad of collateral consequences that
would “supplement” the official sentence.
The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have followed the example of
the Nesbeth court and have concluded that justice cannot be served without
considering collateral consequences during sentencing. Other circuits,
however, have disagreed with their sister courts. The First, Sixth, Seventh,
† J.D. Candidate, 2019, Liberty University School of Law. I would like to first and
foremost thank God for giving me the strength and determination to accomplish things (like
this Note) that I never thought I could. I would also like to thank my family and my wife for
supporting me through thick and thin, even when I have no time to acknowledge that
support. I would like to thank the Law Review staff for their time and commitment in
helping make this Note possible. Lastly, I would like to thank the reader for taking the time
to read this Note.
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Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits firmly hold that the consideration of collateral
consequences is not appropriate for judicial sentencing. These circuits are
concerned that considering some of these consequences would lead to
courts sentencing defendants who have more to lose more lightly than those
who have less to lose.
The Nesbeth decision was a step in the right direction; however, it did not
resolve the issue correctly. There are several proposed solutions to this
collateral consequences issue. The most obvious is the approach taken by
the courts, like the one in Nestbeth, that have decided to consider these
consequences. Those courts simply consider all consequences of conviction
and attempt to sentence appropriately. However, while justice is the goal,
this method results in the consideration of some consequences that are not
justiciable, and is, therefore, not the answer.
The American Law Institute has also proposed a solution. While its
approach is close to correct, this method complicates things too much and
results in the equivalent of tying the courts’ hands during sentencing.
As is the case with many legal issues, the only true solution lies in the
hands of the Legislature. Considering the Legislature is partially to blame
for the creation of many of these collateral consequences, it is only
appropriate that this branch also be the one to fix the problem. First, a line
of demarcation must be drawn between the different kinds of collateral
consequences. Second, the Legislature should grant authority to the courts
to consider only the appropriate consequences. Lastly, the courts should
evaluate all of the appropriate collateral consequences during sentencing in
order to impose a truly proportional sentence that will serve the ends of
justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Collateral consequences have existed for as long as justice has. In United
States v. Nesbeth,1 the court identified the issues surrounding collateral
consequences and a circuit split concerning these issues. The court
evaluated its options and held that in order to serve the ends of justice and
form a just sentence, it must take these consequences into consideration
during sentencing. While many courts agree with this conclusion, just as
many find that consideration of collateral consequences is a slippery slope
that leads to discrimination and injustice.
This Note proposes that while the Nesbeth court was on the right track, it
did not answer the collateral consequences question quite right. Section II

1. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
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of this Note discusses the history of collateral consequences and how courts
on each side of the circuit split have handled them. Section III of this Note
analyzes the different kinds of collateral consequences and several different
solutions that have been proposed by legal institutions. Lastly, Section IV of
this Note proposes the ultimate solution to the issue of collateral
consequences and contemplates what courts should do in the meantime.
II. BACKGROUND
During sentencing reform in the 1980s, Congress highlighted “four basic
purposes of sentencing: punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.”2 However, in a manner that can only be described as
counterintuitive, the American penal system today is actively thwarting
these purposes. Successful reintegration of ex-offenders is being prevented
by “‘[m]yriad laws, rules, and regulations.’”3 These laws, rules, and
regulations are often referred to as “collateral consequences”4 and attach, in
different form and number, to nearly everyone with a criminal record.
In his Nesbeth opinion, Judge Block went as far as to compare the effect
of these collateral consequences to “‘civil death’—or ‘the loss of rights . . . by
a person who has been outlawed or convicted of a serious crime.’”5 Indeed,
civil death is not a new concept. The dangers and gravity of this status has
been known for centuries.6 Early Colonial laws only applied these
devastating consequences to a small handful of felonies.7 However, as
America grew, so did the penal system. With this growth came an influx of
new crimes, each of which now holds its own treasure trove of collateral
consequences that can wreak havoc on a convicted person’s life.8

2. Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised
Release, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 997 (2013) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012)).
3. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 142 (2010)).
4. Margaret Colgate Love, Managing Collateral Consequences in the Sentencing
Process: The Revised Sentencing Articles of the Model Penal Code, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 247,
258 (2015).
5. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 180-81 (quoting Civil Death, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014)).
6. Jean Chung, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (May
10, 2016), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/felony-disenfranchisement-aprimer/.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Collateral consequences can result in devastating effects for a convicted
person, but still many courts refuse to consider them when sentencing.9
Courts’ hesitancy to consider these consequences during sentencing is likely
the result of these “penalties” or “regulations” being considered legislative
or regulatory rather than punitive.10 Therefore, because these collateral
consequences are imposed by law rather than included in a judicial
sentence, they have been considered by some courts as not “subject to
constitutional limitation.”11
Courts that have chosen to consider collateral consequences, like the
court in Nesbeth, see past labels like “penalty” and “regulation.” Instead,
these courts see that the effects of these consequences are punitive, and,
therefore, they should, to some extent, be considered when sentencing.
Nesbeth is not the first case where collateral consequences were taken into
consideration when sentencing.12 However, it is perhaps the first case to
focus almost solely on the effect and applicability of collateral consequences.
To truly understand the impact of this case, it is necessary to briefly open
the history books to observe the evolution of the American penal system.
A. The Very Beginning, A Very Good Place to Start
During the development of the English and Irish prison systems in the
1850s, the ultimate goal of incarceration was clear: successful reintegration
into society.13 As a matter of fact, reintegration was so central to these early
models that if a prisoner could not find a job when his sentence was nearing
completion, the prison managers would aid him in finding one.14 Both the
English and Irish models worked on a “mark” system whereby prisoners’
good behavior and progress in education and learning a trade could secure
them an early release.15 In the Irish system, the last stage of incarceration
involved living in an “intermediate” prison in which prisoners would dress
in ordinary clothing, live in a community, and have minimal supervision.16
This unique and effective prison model resulted in low recidivism rates and
9. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 180.
10. Love, supra note 4, at 258.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253, 262-63 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding
that the lower court did not err by considering deportation as a collateral consequence of
conviction, when crafting the defendant’s sentence).
13. Doherty, supra note 2, at 974-76.
14. Id. at 982.
15. Id. at 972-73.
16. Id. at 972.
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nearly seamless reintegration.17 However, the most important aspect of
these early models was their understanding and consideration of collateral
consequences.
In Ireland, when a prisoner obtained employment and was released, the
only post-sentence consequence was a duty to report monthly to local law
enforcement.18 The English system considered collateral consequences even
more seriously, releasing prisoners unsupervised and with no attachments
from their incarceration.19 “To impose police supervision over a poor
wretch struggling to find employment is the way to add to his difficulties
and throw him back into crime instead of keeping him out of it.”20 The
stance taken by these early models was that nothing should come between a
former prisoner and his ability to reintegrate into society.
Observing these models, the American penal system chose to adopt
similar principles of incarceration when developing its own system.
Incorporating many of the English and Irish principles, new prisons were
opened with great success, and by 1901 twelve states had opened prisons
based on this new model.21 Unfortunately, by 1940, the Department of
Justice reported that this system was failing because, with growing rates of
incarceration, the prisons were becoming too difficult to run.22 It was at this
time the penal system started to change, and by 1974, it was determined that
“‘rehabilitative efforts . . . have had no appreciable effect on recidivism.’”23
It is not that keeping recidivism rates low is no longer a goal of the justice
system. As a matter of fact, all ninety-three judicial districts allow for a form
of pretrial diversion program.24 Pretrial diversion programs allow

17. See id.
18. Id. at 974-75.
19. Doherty, supra note 2, at 974.
20. Id. (quoting Joshua Jebb, Explanations Showing the Difficulties Which Would
Attend the Introduction into England of the Probationary Stages of Discipline and
Supervision of the Police, &c., Which Have Been Adopted in Ireland, TRANSACTIONS OF THE
NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE PROMOTION OF SOC. SCI. 402, 411, 414 (George W. Hastings ed., 1863)).
21. Doherty, supra note 2, at 982.
22. Id. at 983.
23. Id. at 994 (quoting Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About
Prision Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974)).
24. Josev Brewer, The Work in the United States Attorney’s Offices Across the Sequential
Intercept Model, 12 LIBERTY U. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2018). In his article, Brewer
explains that in some jurisdictions, special pretrial diversion courts decide admission to the
program. Id. In the District of South Carolina, the court looks specifically at certain collateral
matters such as education, employment, and contact with a pretrial officer; still, these
considerations may not come into play during sentencing. Id.
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prosecutors, in some cases, to help potential convicts stay out of the official
prosecution and sentencing processes altogether.25 Participants who
successfully complete the program may avoid ever being charged.26
Unfortunately, these programs still do not address collateral consequences.
First, not all individuals are eligible for the diversion program. Also, even
those individuals who are eligible receive no aid at trial if they fail the
program. Therefore, even though these programs represent an effort to
meet the ends of justice, they do not directly address one of the biggest
oversights that still exists.
Today, while rehabilitation and reintegration are still some of the stated
purposes of sentencing,27 as many as “50,000 federal and state statutes and
regulations . . . impose penalties, disabilities, or disadvantages on convicted
felons.”28 These statutes and regulations often make successful reintegration
nearly impossible and yet, many courts have still refused to take them into
consideration when crafting sentences. The court in Nesbeth did not follow
that trend; instead, it chose to consider these devastating consequences in
order to craft a more just sentence.
B. All About United States v. Nesbeth
The defendant in Nesbeth was convicted of importation and possession
of cocaine.29 Prior to this conviction, the defendant had never been
convicted of a crime and otherwise led a law-abiding life.30 Furthermore, the
Eastern District of New York noted that although the defendant had grown
up in lower-income circumstances, she had never used drugs herself and
likely was just a courier for her boyfriend.31 At the time of conviction, the
defendant was a 20-year-old college student studying education.32
Additionally, the defendant had supported herself as a nail technician at a
children’s spa, worked as a counselor to children in lower-income areas,

25. Id.
26. Id. (citing USAM § 9-22.010 (2011)).
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2012) (“The court, in determining the particular
sentence to be imposed, shall consider—the need for the sentence imposed—to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner . . . .”).
28. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 184 (E.D.N.Y 2016).
29. Id. at 180.
30. Id. at 189.
31. Id. at 189-90.
32. Id. at 189. Due to the conviction, the defendant changed her major to sociology. Id.
at 190.
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and held seasonal employment on a parks maintenance crew.33 In all, the
court highlighted that this conviction was “completely out of character.”34
At the time the Nesbeth decision was made, there was already
jurisprudence governing how to come to a sentencing decision. When
reviewing the defendant’s personal information, the court must engage in a
“multi-step process through which . . . [it] assesses the seriousness of [the]
defendant’s current offense and past crimes to . . . determine the
defendant’s applicable sentencing range . . . .”35 All of this information is
then put into a “pre-sentencing report” (“PSR”) which contains “guidelines”
that help the sentencing court determine what the proper sentence should
be.36 After the Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, these guidelines
were rendered only advisory, albeit still necessary to at least consider when
sentencing.37 In United States v. Gall,38 the Court laid out a three-step
process for courts to follow when crafting a sentence.39 First, the sentencing
court must figure out the proper guidelines range; second, the court must
give both parties a chance to argue for what sentence they believe is
appropriate; lastly, the sentencing court must consider all of the 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) factors to determine what sentence is appropriate.40 These factors
go directly towards Congress’ intent to address the goals of sentencing, and
are as follows:
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed,
shall consider—(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need
for the sentence imposed—(A) to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect of the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes
of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner . . . .41

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 189.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 471 (4th Cir. 2007).
See, e.g., Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 188-89.
Pauley, 511 F.3d at 472 (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)).
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473.
Id. (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007)).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
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The last step of the sentencing process is where the conflict arises.
Generally, it has been held that, in considering the § 3553(a) factors, courts
have broad discretion.42 Additionally, in determining what falls under the §
3553(a) factor “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant,” courts are not limited and may
consider “background, character, and conduct.”43 If, however, the court
does choose to deviate far from the guidelines and § 3553(a) factors, it must
justify such deviation.44 This was the issue in Nesbeth. There, the court
decided to deviate from the guidelines and the enumerated sentencing
factors to instead put great weight on the collateral consequences of the
conviction.
In Nesbeth, the Probation Department issued a PSR which recommended
a sentence of twenty-four months and three years of supervised release.45
However, the PSR contained no reference to any collateral consequences.46
The court took issue with this and concluded that collateral consequences
must be considered in order to craft a sentence that is “sufficient[] but not
greater than necessary” to meet the ends of sentencing.47 After requesting
and receiving a list of all applicable collateral consequences,48 the court
highlighted that as a result of a felony conviction, the defendant would be
ineligible for tuition assistance for the remainder of her college career.49
Furthermore, a substantial number of statutory impairments would
permanently attach to the defendant.50 The court also noted that this
conviction would likely result in a strain on important family relationships
and may result in prejudice when seeking certain employment.51
After considering all of these factors, the court sentenced the defendant
to one year of probation with some additional conditions, including a sixmonth period of house arrest.52 In forming this sentence, the court reasoned

42. United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v.
Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008)).
43. United States v. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x 423, 444 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting United
States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822, 836 (10th Cir. 2008)).
44. Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473.
45. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
46. Id. at 188.
47. Id. at 194 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)).
48. Id. at 188.
49. Id. at 190.
50. Id. at 190-93.
51. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 190-93.
52. Id. at 194-96.
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that the collateral consequences were sufficient punishment and that
incarceration would be unnecessary to meet the ends of sentencing
according to § 3553(a).53
C. Right Down the Middle: What the Circuits are Saying About Collateral
Consequences
Nesbeth is not representative of the majority rule. While it is true that
courts have discretion to step outside of the § 3553(a) factors, courts have
generally construed this discretion as permitting consideration of the
defendant’s history or personal life, not subsequent collateral
consequences.54 In 2003, the Supreme Court asserted that statutory
collateral consequences should not be considered in sentencing as they
represent only “civil disabilities” and not punishment.55 However, this
opinion did little to conclusively resolve the question of which collateral
consequences should be considered in sentencing. Meanwhile, courts have
been growing increasingly more uncomfortable with turning a blind eye to
these collateral consequences.56 At the same time, because they are often a
creature of legislation, many courts continue to consider these
consequences “none of their business.”57 This split was mentioned in
Nesbeth58 and should be thoroughly analyzed before an attempt is made to
truly resolve the issue of collateral consequences.
At the risk of oversimplification, the two stances that circuits have taken
in this matter can be boiled down to the following conclusions: (1) some
circuits say collateral consequences must be considered and (2) others say
they simply cannot.
Representing the latter, the First, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have identified several cases in which sentences were reduced after
consideration was given to what the courts refer to as “impermissible”
factors.59 In each of these cases the sentencing decision was reversed on

53. Id. at 194.
54. See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 474 (4th Cir. 2007); see also United States
v. Stall, 581 F.3d 276, 289 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that while family ties are not usually
relevant to sentencing, they may be considered relevant if they have some connection to
other permissible considerations under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
55. Love, supra note 4, at 258-59 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
56. Id. at 259.
57. Id. at 260.
58. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 186-88.
59. United States v. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x 423, 444-46 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing United
States v. Stall, 581 F.3d 276, 286 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Musgrave, 761 F.3d 602, 604
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appeal.60 These circuits hold that § 3553(a) requires that the court fashion a
sentence that reflects the seriousness of the offense alone, not the
seriousness of the collateral consequences suffered by the defendant.61
On the other side of the split, the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits
have chosen instead to align themselves with the reasoning of the Nesbeth
court and consider collateral consequences.62 These circuits hold that
judicial discretion can safeguard against any harmful results identified by
the other circuits. It is the opinion of these courts that sentencing cannot be
just unless the collateral consequences of conviction are taken into
consideration.
So, which side got it right? Would considering collateral consequences
lead to overburdening the courts and possibly discrimination? Are
convicted persons being sentenced with much more than what a judge
imposes on them? These questions have yet to be conclusively answered,
although the circuits have each presented their own solutions.
1. One Holding to Rule Them All: How the Tenth Circuit in United
States v. Morgan Represented the Stance of the First, Sixth, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits
The court in United States v. Morgan was tasked with reviewing the
sentence imposed on the defendant by the lower court.63 The defendant was
a practicing attorney who was elected to the Oklahoma State Senate in
1996.64 It was while the defendant served on the senate, as chairman of the
appropriations committee, that the bribery that ultimately led to his
conviction and sentencing took place.65
In 2005 and 2006, members of the Oklahoma Assisted Living Association
(“OKALA”) started to become unhappy with the Oklahoma Department of
Health’s practice of transferring residents from OKALA facilities to nursing
homes.66 One such member, Crosby, an OKALA facility owner, decided to
take action at this time and hired a lobbyist in an attempt to sway the state

(6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 1999)).
60. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x at 444-47.
61. Id. at 445.
62. E.g., United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2014).
63. United States v. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x 423, 425 (10th Cir. 2015).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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senate.67 During a meeting between the lobbyist, Crosby, and the defendant,
the defendant told Crosby, “This is the way it works. You pay me a $1,000 a
month retainer.”68 In exchange for these payments, the defendant eventually
took action in the senate to limit the interaction the department of health
had with OKALA facilities.69
The defendant was indicted on sixty-three counts of bribery and fraud
ranging over several years and involving several different schemes.70
However, after a two-week trial, the defendant was only convicted of a
single count of bribery in connection with Crosby.71 Although the
defendant was only convicted on a single count, due to the nature and
circumstances surrounding that single count, the lower court was given a
PSR with a recommended sentencing range of 188 to 235 months.72
Fortunately for the defendant, that was a recommendation the sentencing
court did not intend to follow.
The lower court began the sentencing process correctly by considering
the guidelines.73 After an initial glance, however, the sentencing judge began
chiseling away at the recommendation after reviewing several factors. First,
the judge noted that the sentencing guideline incorporated too much of the
information associated with the other counts the defendant was charged
with but never convicted.74 From there, the sentencing judge continued
striking down the recommendation based on the “goals” of sentencing and
the collateral consequences that would be suffered by the defendant.75
Specifically, the judge began by noting that the court had received 482
letters in support of the defendant and his character.76 In observing these
letters the judge noted, “I don’t think that I would know 482 people to even
ask for a letter, much less get a positive one from all of them back.”77 After
considering the content and meaning of the letters, the judge mentioned
several other factors that he believed should come into play during this
phase of sentencing. In response to the prosecution’s prayer for
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 426.
United States v. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x 423, 426-27 (10th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 427-28.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 439-40.
Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x at 440-41.
Id. at 441.
Id.
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incarceration, the judge commented to the defendant, “I am personally of
the opinion that the publicity that has followed this case from the
beginning, the results to you both in your health, your financial health, the
fact that you will almost certainly lose your license to practice law, I think
all of these are factors that would surely deter anyone else considering the
same conduct.”
After summarizing his considerations, the judge finally sentenced the
defendant to five years of probation, 104 hours of community service, and
forfeiture of $12,000 in bribery money.78 With that, the defendant had
managed to go from the possibility of prison for nearly twenty years to only
five years of probation and a small dent in his wallet.
Upon appeal, the Tenth Circuit began by explaining the correct
procedure for sentencing.79 In so doing, the court laid out a two-step
analysis to evaluate what the court referred to as “procedural
reasonableness” and “substantive reasonableness.”80 While these
distinctions do aid the court in coming to a conclusion, they contribute
little to the analysis of this Note. Suffice it to say, the main concern
mentioned by the Tenth Circuit was that if a sentencing court makes a large
variance from the guideline range, such variance must be supported by a
significant justification—a justification that, in this case, the Tenth Circuit
failed to find.81 After reviewing some of the initial reasoning the sentencing
court gave for a downgraded sentence, the Tenth Circuit turned its
attention to the collateral consequences that were used to form the lenient
sentence.82 Without delay the court found that the sentencing court had
“erred in determining [the defendant] was adequately punished” by the
aforementioned collateral consequences.83 The Tenth Circuit held these
consequences as impermissible considerations, not because they did not
exist, but because they had nothing to do with sentencing and would lead to
unjust results.
The “unjust results” that the Tenth Circuit looked to avoid are often
referred to as “middle class sentencing.” Middle class sentencing occurs
when a court impermissibly relies upon factors related to a defendant’s

78. Id. at 440.
79. Id. at 442.
80. Id.
81. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x. at 442 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50
(2007)).
82. Id. at 444.
83. Id.
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social or economic standings.84 Here, the Tenth Circuit found that while
generally there is no limitation on consideration of such factors as the
history, character, and conduct of the defendant, “‘[i]t is impermissible for a
court to impose a lighter sentence on white-collar defendants . . . because . .
. [they] suffer greater reputational harm or have more to lose by
conviction.’”85 If courts consider all collateral consequences, the result may
be unfair discrimination to those with less-fortunate backgrounds. Due to
its concern with middle class sentencing, the Tenth Circuit, in Morgan,
decided that none of the collateral consequences originally observed by the
sentencing court should be considered because “[t]hey impermissibly favor
criminals, like [the defendant], with privileged backgrounds.”86
The Tenth Circuit also identified several other circuits that, like itself,
had held in opposition of considering collateral consequences when
sentencing. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit “agree[d] with the reasoning of
the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. By considering publicity, loss of
law license, and deterioration of physical and financial health as
punishment, the court impermissibly focused on the collateral
consequences of Morgan's prosecution and conviction.”87 The court cited to
several cases in which sentences were reduced after consideration was given
to factors such as education and vocational skills, a requirement to register
as a sex offender, years of litigation, loss of licenses, and generally leading a
life with a felony conviction looming above them.88 In each of these cases,
the sentencing decision was reversed on appeal due to consideration of
impermissible factors.89 The Tenth Circuit agreed with these other circuits
in finding that § 3553(a) requires that the court fashion a sentence that
reflects the seriousness of the offense, not the seriousness of the collateral

84. United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 1999). However, even after
explaining the pitfalls of middle class sentencing, the court in Stefonek went on to conclude,
“We do not know whether the district judge would have departed downward on the basis of
extraordinary family circumstances alone.” Id. This tends to insinuate that if the lower court
had reduced the sentence on the basis of those circumstances, the sentence would have been
affirmed. Perhaps the Seventh Circuit is still on the fence when it comes to collateral
consequences and sentencing.
85. United States v. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x 423, 444 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting United
States v. Prosperi, 686 F.3d 32, 47 (1st Cir. 2012)).
86. Id. at 446.
87. Id. at 445.
88. Id. at 444-46 (citing United States v. Stall, 581 F.3d 276, 286 (6th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Musgrave, 761 F.3d 602, 604 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d
1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 1999)).
89. Morgan, 635 Fed. App’x at 444-46.

480

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:467

consequences suffered by the defendant.90 The court concluded that because
“[n]one of these collateral consequences are properly included in [the
defendant’s] sentence,” they are out of the court’s hands and should not be
considered.91
Unfortunately, in an attempt to avoid the harmful results of middle class
sentencing, the Tenth Circuit—along with all the other circuits it cited—
failed to discern which collateral consequences truly were impermissible,
and which should be considered because of their objectivity. This
determination is a vital step in forming a just sentence. Conversely, while
these circuits’ wholesale disregard for collateral consequences may be
incorrect, the circuits on the other side of this issue may also overcorrect.
2. The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits: A New Hope
Other circuits are not as concerned with the pitfalls identified by the
courts in opposition to the consideration of collateral consequences.
Relying instead on judicial discretion, the courts in these circuits hold that
sentencing can only be fair if all of the consequences of conviction are
evaluated. The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits align themselves with
the Nesbeth court in finding that the consideration of collateral
consequences is appropriate.
a. United States v. Thavaraja
In United States v. Thavaraja, the defendant was a Sri Lanka native, born
and raised during a civil war.92 After moving to England as a refugee,
obtaining his bachelor’s degree, and teaching there for a short time, the
defendant moved back to Sri Lanka.93 It was at this time that he became
involved in a minority political group seeking to establish an independent
government.94 Though the sentencing judge would later describe this group
as “no direct threat to the United States,” officially, the group was
categorized as a terrorist organization.95 While he was involved with the
group, the defendant procured twenty million dollars’ worth of military
weapons and engaged in several forms of illegal bribery.96
90. Id. at 445.
91. Id. at 446.
92. United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 2014).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 255. This political group was known as the LTTE and, while it stood for
legitimate causes such as an end to the oppression of the Sri Lankan people, it perpetuated its
mission through violence and war. Id.
95. Id. at 257.
96. Id. at 256.
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Upon being captured, the defendant was extradited to the United States
for prosecution, where, after six years of incarceration, he was convicted of
war crimes.97 The sentencing court was given a guideline range of 360
months to life; however, due to max-sentence restrictions, that
recommendation was capped at 240 months.98 Despite these
recommendations, however, the sentencing court, looking to the “full range
of circumstances presented,” imposed a sentence of only “108 months on
[one] charge and 60 months on [another] (to run concurrently).”99
The prosecutors argued that the sentencing court evaluated certain
impermissible considerations such as the defendant’s imminent
deportation.100 The Second Circuit was not persuaded by this argument and,
instead, found that all of the sentencing court’s considerations were
proper.101 In fact, the court found that “a sentencing judge may
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as
to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it
may come.”102 The court found that considerations of the defendant’s time
served, family situation, and likely deportation were all permissible
considerations necessary to arriving at a sentence that is “sufficient, but not
greater than necessary” to serve the ends of justice.103 In concluding, the
Second Circuit found that the sentencing court had imposed a sentence that
“reflects thoughtful and principled consideration by a conscientious district
judge of all the factors relevant to an individualized determination of a fair
and just sentence.”104
The Second Circuit, in Thavaraja, recognized the impact of collateral
consequences and their impact on a convicted person’s life. Because of that,
the court decided that it was appropriate to consider these consequences
when forming a sentence. In this way, the Second Circuit aligned itself with
the reasoning of the Nesbeth court.
b. United States v. Pauley
The Fourth Circuit was faced with a similar scenario when the lower
sentencing court reduced a sentence after considering several collateral

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 256-58.
Thavaraja, 740 F.3d at 257.
Id. at 258
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id. (citing Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 398 (1995)).
Id. at 262-63.
Thavaraja, 740 F.3d at 263.
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consequences. In United States v. Pauley, the defendant was an art teacher
at a high school when he was approached by an underage student to
purchase lude photographs the student had taken of herself.105 The
defendant agreed to this transaction and the two continued this relationship
for over a year.106 Eventually, an investigation was conducted, and the
images given by the underage student were found.107 The defendant was
arrested and charged with possession of child pornography.108
At trial, a PSR was generated, proposing a suggested sentencing range of
97 to 121 months’ incarceration.109 However, like the court in Thavaraja,
the sentencing court did not adhere to this recommendation. The
sentencing court imposed a downward variance sentence of only forty-two
month’s imprisonment, naming several factors that were influential in the
large divergence.110 Among these factors, the lower court considered that
the defendant was a “model citizen and a good father” and would “los[e] his
teaching certificate and his state pension.”111 On appeal, the prosecution
argued that these factors were not relevant and led to an “unreasonable”
sentence variation.112 The Fourth Circuit disagreed.
In reviewing the sentence, the court found that the consideration of
factors such as the defendant’s family life was consistent with § 3553’s
“history and characteristics” factor.113 Further, the court did not find error
in the sentencing court’s consideration of the fact that the defendant would
lose his teaching certificate and state pension.114 In fact, the Fourth Circuit
found that consideration of factors such as these reflects “the need for ‘just
punishment’ and ‘adequate deterrence.’”115 The court concluded that the
sentence met the ends of justice and affirmed the lower court’s decision.116
The conviction of the circuits on this side of the split is that “[i]t is
difficult to see how a court can properly calibrate a ‘just punishment’ if it

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 469 (4th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 469-70.
Id.
Id. at 470.
Id.
Id.
Pauley, 511 F.3d at 470.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 474-75
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)).
Id. at 475-76.
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does not consider the collateral effects of a particular sentence.”117 The
courts in Nesbeth, Thavaraja, and Pauley are not alone in this conviction.118
More and more courts are recognizing the importance of collateral
consequences in forming a just sentence. Unfortunately, while this
recognition does result in more just sentencing most of the time, courts’
approaches to considering these consequences is not ideal.
Much like how the circuits in opposition to the consideration of
collateral consequences fell to one extreme by refusing to consider any form
of them, the circuits in support of such consideration fell to the opposite
extreme. Because they have recognized how collateral consequences affect
individuals even after their sentence is served, these courts allow virtually
any consideration to influence their sentencing decisions. Such
consequences could range from statutory provisions that limit a convicted
person’s right to vote to social changes, such as the convicted person being
excluded from family or community events.
The court in Nesbeth, along with the courts in the Second, Fourth, and
Eighth Circuits, took a step in the right direction. They recognized that
while sentences may be just, standing alone, when all of the collateral
consequences of conviction are considered, the result is often essentially
“over-sentencing.” However, although the court in Nesbeth was trying to
bring about the most just result, the manner in which they went about
doing so is not the ultimate solution to this issue.
III. TOO HOT, TOO COLD, AND JUST RIGHT: WHAT NESBETH, AND OTHER
DECISIONS, GOT RIGHT AND WHAT THEY GOT WRONG
The Nesbeth decision represents a step towards a more just method of
sentencing. However, all of the courts that have addressed collateral
consequences have failed to parse out the real issue. Because of this, they
could not prescribe the best solution or approach. In order to truly
understand collateral consequences and their role in sentencing, a court
must first identify the different categories of collateral consequences. While
the courts in the above decisions seemed to have lumped all of the
consequences together (either rejecting them or embracing them), that is
not the correct approach. Because of this confusion, decisions on both sides

117. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting United
States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2009)).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 533 F.3d 623, 633 (8th Cir. 2008) (choosing to
consider the defendant’s “loss of . . . reputation and his company” when sentencing).
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of the circuit split have been partially correct.119 After identifying the
different kinds of collateral consequences, one must select a solution that
appropriately incorporates these consequences into sentencing. This second
step is vital to ensure that the sentence is adjusted in conjunction with
collateral consequences, but not unreasonably so.120 Finally, one must
ensure the sentencing purposes of § 3553(a) are still being met.
A. One of These Things Is Not Like the Other: Identifying Different Forms of
Collateral Consequences
In crafting the defendant’s sentence in Nesbeth, the court considered
several collateral consequences.121 Some of these consequences were
statutory and attached to the defendant as a matter of law. Two such
consequences were, (1) being barred from obtaining employment in an
FDIC-insured bank for ten years and (2) being permanently prevented from
owning a firearm.122 Other consequences considered by the court were not
attached as a matter of law. The court highlighted that because child care
services conduct background checks, the defendant’s conviction may be
grounds for her being denied employment.123 Clearly these consequences
are different in nature. While the former attaches as a matter of law, the
latter may or may not attach as a result of conviction. However, the court
failed to recognize the distinction in Nesbeth, choosing instead to bundle all
of these into the category of “collateral consequences.”
This is not an uncommon occurrence. All of the courts discussed in this
Note failed to distinguish different collateral consequences as well. This
should not be the case. Each kind of collateral consequence is
fundamentally different and deserves its own analysis. This Note proposes
that there should be two categories of collateral consequences: legislative
and civil.

119. As will be discussed in the next subsection, there are some collateral consequences
that should be considered 100 percent of the time and others that should almost never be
considered. Because of this, when the circuits on one side of the split say that certain
considerations are “impermissible,” they are partially correct. Likewise, on the other side of
the split, when the circuits say that all collateral consequences must be considered, they too
are partially right. The only way to resolve these decisions is to dissect exactly what is
appropriate for consideration and what is not.
120. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (emphasizing the importance of
adhering to sentencing guidelines, only varying for good cause).
121. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 190-93 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
122. Id. at 191 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1544.229 (2016); 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2016)).
123. Id. at 190-91.
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1. Legislative Consequences
Legislative consequences are sometimes referred to as “mandatory”
because they attach to a defendant after conviction automatically by ways of
statutory sanction or some other regulation.124 Sentencing courts have no
discretion over these legislative consequences and historically have not
considered them when sentencing.125 However, these are just the
consequences that must be considered. They are not a part of the court’s
sentence but still impose penalties on the defendant that sometimes last
forever.126 In Virginia alone, the commission of any felony results in the
application of over four-hundred different collateral consequences.127 These
include consequences such as ineligibility to participate in some Medicaid
services;128 revocation of certain types of insurances;129 and even denial of
certain professional certifications.130
Because these consequences are a result of legislation, many courts view
them as regulatory only, ignoring entirely their punitive nature. Therefore,
sentences imposed by courts in such jurisdictions represent only the
beginning of a convicted individual’s true punishment. The courts that do
realize the impact of these consequences understand that they cannot
impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary”
according to § 3553(a)131 without first considering post-sentence
consequences.
Another reason legislative consequences should be considered is because
they are objective. While speculation about the social or economic status of
a defendant after conviction can often times lead to discrimination,
legislative consequences attach after conviction regardless of social or

124. Love, supra note 4, at 259.
125. Id.
126. See Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences Upon Conviction, JUSTICE.GOV
(October 14, 2017, 9:39 PM), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pardon/legacy/2006/11/
13/collateral_consequences.pdf; see also, The Council of State Governments, National Inventory of
the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, JUST. CTR. THE COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’T (October 14, 2017
9:34 p.m.), https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/description/.
127. The Council of State Governments, Virginia, JUST. CTR. THE COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’T
(January 10, 2018, 4:58 PM), https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/search/?jurisdiction=47.
128. The Council of State Governments, Consequence Details, JUST. CTR. THE COUNCIL OF
ST. GOV’T (January 10, 2018, 4:58 PM), https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/
consequences/154858/.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
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economic status.132 A court considering these consequences would not have
to fear the pitfall of middle class sentencing. Additionally, while
consideration of legislative consequences would require more work of
sentencing judges, accessing and assessing these consequences would not be
unreasonable. The court in Nesbeth simply asked the probation department
to compile a list of the applicable consequences.133 Alternatively, courts
could utilize the numerous collateral consequences databases created by
both governmental and non-governmental entities.134 These databases make
it simple and easy to view all applicable consequences according to state and
offense.135
However, although these legislative consequences are truly punitive in
nature and always objective, they are somehow still not regularly considered
when forming sentences. This was not the case with the court in Nesbeth.
There, the court made the right decision in having the Probation
Department compile a list of the applicable legislative consequences so that
the court could better shape the sentence. These legislative consequences
were not the only ones considered by the court in Nesbeth.
2. Civil Consequences
While legislative consequences should always be considered when
sentencing, civil consequences should be considered sparingly, if at all.136
While these are the kinds of consequences that are often felt the most and
garner the most attention in both the public and private eye, courts’
consideration of these would more often than not result in distortion of
justice.137 This is because civil consequences generally look to a defendant’s
social or economic condition. It is easy to see how consideration of such
subjective factors could result in inconsistent sentencing.

132. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 184-85.
133. Id. at 188.
134. See Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences Upon Conviction, JUSTICE.GOV
(October 14, 2017, 9:39 PM), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pardon/legacy/
2006/11/13/collateral_consequences.pdf; see also, The Council of State Governments, National
Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, JUST. CTR. THE COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’T
(October 14, 2017, 9:34 PM), https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/description/.
135. Id.
136. The author of this Note uses the term “civil consequences” to describe a very broad,
often ambiguous category of consequences.
137. See Shaila Dewan, The Collateral Victims of Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES (October
14, 2017, 9:43 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/sunday-review/the-collateralvictims-of-criminal-justice.html (showing how the public often views collateral
consequences).
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In Nesbeth, the court identified several consequences that would fall into
the “civil” category. Specifically, the court relied quite heavily on the fact
that the defendant may not be selected for work in her chosen field:
education.138 While this consequence may very well be the result of the
defendant’s conviction, it is far from absolute. At best, the court could only
speculate as to what effect the conviction would have on the defendant’s
employment opportunities.139 In choosing to consider this consequence, the
Nesbeth court could have easily fallen prey to the dangers of middle class
sentencing.140
Consider a hypothetical. Imagine that instead of a poor young college
student whose dream was to teach children (such as the defendant in
Nesbeth), the defendant was a law student just about to obtain her J.D. At
the time she was charged with drug distribution and possession, this law
student had job offers from three of the country’s largest firms. Surely, the
consequence of losing those three high-paying firm positions would be
greater than the loss of being able to teach in a small school, right? Looking
at the two scenarios from a purely financial aspect, the law student has
much more to lose than the potential school teacher. This is the problem
with considering civil consequences. Unlike legislative consequences, civil
ones tend to favor those who have more to lose. It is hard for a court to be
objective and impartial when considering such factors.
Civil consequences are not always impermissible, however. As
mentioned previously, sentencing courts have broad discretion over what
factors to consider under §3553(a).141 This discretion was not granted in
error. In considering which factors are relevant to a specific defendant,
courts should use their judicial experience to conclude what civil
consequences would fit within or meet the purposes of §3553(a). For
instance, §3553 specifically requires courts to consider the “history and
characteristics of each defendant.”142 This requirement clearly shows that
there is a strong element of subjectivity to sentencing. It is when a sentence
is lessened or unreasonably changed because of civil consequences that such
considerations may be abused. Instead, if a court considered certain

138. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 190.
139. Id.
140. See also United States v. Anderson, 533 F.3d 623, 633 (8th Cir. 2008) (choosing to
consider the defendant’s “loss of . . . reputation and his company” when sentencing).
141. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012).
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subjective factors and made “sideways”143 adjustments in sentencing, justice
could still be served and middle class sentencing avoided. In this way, some
civil consequences that are not specifically enumerated in § 3553(a) may be
considered without being discriminatory.
Of course, civil consequences can be dangerous to consider for the same
reasons legislative consequences are prudent to consider. First, unlike
legislative consequences, civil consequences are almost always subjective.
Therefore, consideration of civil consequences can much more easily result
in middle class sentencing than the consideration of legislative ones.
Further, accessing and assessing appropriate civil consequences is much
more difficult and nuanced than with legislative ones. While there are
databases and probation offices to aid a court in reviewing all applicable
legislative consequences, there are no such tools to access civil
consequences. Because of this, when a court attempts to consider these
subjective consequences, what was intended as a well-meaning
consideration may in fact be non-justiciable speculation.
Due to their punitive nature, objectivity, and ease of review, legislative
consequences should always be considered by courts when crafting
sentences. This will ensure that a defendant is not over-sentenced by
consequences that do not even relate to his offense. Conversely, civil
consequences should be considered only when absolutely appropriate.
Other than the factors enumerated in §3553(a), courts should be
conservative when considering other post-conviction consequences.
Specifically, when determining whether a consequence is appropriate to
consider, courts should stay clear of consequences relating to a defendant’s
social or economic standing. In this way, courts will be able to tailor a
sentence and accomplish the goals of sentencing according to § 3553(a)
while avoiding the pitfalls of middle class sentencing.
B. There Can Only Be One: Examining the Different Ways to Consider
Collateral Consequences
Now that the different categories of collateral consequences have been
separated, this section will examine the different methods of incorporating

143. The term “sideways adjustment” refers to a sentencing court changing not the
severity, but the nature of a punishment. For instance, if, after the considerations of
reasonable civil consequences, a judge was to determine that a recommended custodial
sentence would result in inequitable consequences to the convict, the judge could impose a
higher non-custodial sentence instead. By increasing the non-custodial punishment, a judge
may balance and equate the non-custodial sentence to the custodial one and, while changing
the nature of the punishment, maintain the severity of the penalty.
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these consequences into sentencing. Four methods will be considered: first,
the courts’ “take the wheel” approach; second, the American Bar
Association’s approach; third, the Uniform Law Commission’s approach;
lastly, the Model Penal Code’s approach.
1. The Courts’ “Take the Wheel” Approach
This approach does not require a lengthy discussion as the perfect
example of its application was given in Nesbeth. As discussed above, courts
are growing uncomfortable with the way collateral consequences essentially
create a collateral sentence over which they have no control.144 However,
because courts are well-versed with the distinction between their function
and the Legislature’s, they are hesitant to make a ruling that renders void a
statute or regulation. Instead, they are forced to compromise their sentence.
In Nesbeth, after considering all of the legislative consequences imposed on
the defendant, instead of choosing to limit those consequences, the court
decided to impose a sentence far outside the guidelines.145
The problem with this approach is that courts are limiting themselves
and the carefully constructed sentencing system. While collateral
consequences should be considered, they should not be allowed to impair
this system. However, because courts have no control as to which legislative
penalties apply, they are forced to instead use the power they do have. The
result of the courts’ approach is a distortion in well-established methods of
sentence construction rather than a change in legislative consequences that
may not even be appropriate in the first place. While results like the one in
Nesbeth may represent a more justice-driven approach to sentencing, the
manner in which the court went about considering collateral consequences
is flawed. That being said, it may have been the only choice it had.
2. The American Bar Association’s Approach
In 2003, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) proposed a solution to
the issue of collateral consequences. In its proposal, the ABA suggested that
courts have the power to grant relief from collateral consequences upon
request of the convicted party.146 The proposal also required courts,
according to “generally applicable principles of [sentencing],” to “ensure
that the totality of the penalty is not unduly severe.”147 Other than these
144. Love, supra note 4, at 259.
145. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 194-95 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
146. Love, supra note 4, at 261-62.
147. Id. at 262 (quoting Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Collateral
Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons 9, Standard 19-2.4 (3d ed.
2003)).
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standards, the ABA proposal contained little else to guide courts in their
consideration of collateral consequences.
Besides the general lack of specificity the ABA offered in their proposal,
their solution had a few other problems that rendered it sub-optimal. First,
the proposal did not establish a standard by which courts could review
collateral consequences at sentencing.148 Instead, the proposal merely
suggests that consequences could be considered during or after sentencing.
Also, the proposal does not address civil consequences at all. Therefore,
under this standard, courts are once again left without guidance as to
whether to consider civil consequences. In effect, the ABA’s proposal
created a way by which convicted persons could submit a motion of sorts to
the sentencing court to consider granting relief from a legislative
consequence. This is not the ideal solution because certain collateral
consequences should always be part of a court’s considerations at
sentencing, regardless of any action by the convicted party.
3. The Uniform Law Commission’s Approach
The Uniform Law Commission’s (“ULC”) approach was a bit more
defined than the ABA’s. The ULC permitted a defendant to petition the
sentencing court, at sentencing or before sentencing, for relief from specific
legislative consequences.149 Upon petition, the court could review the
collateral consequences complained of and grant relief after a finding that
such relief would “materially assist the individual in obtaining or
maintaining employment, education, housing, public benefits, or
occupational licensing.”150
This approach resolved the timing issue that was present in the ABA’s
approach. However, other problems with this approach preclude it from
being the ultimate solution. One such problem is the test proposed for
courts to use. In essence, this proposal requires courts to conduct a form of
rational relation test between the collateral consequence and the convicted
person’s job, education, living situation, or other subjective needs. While
this does offer relief where relief may be needed, it is not the appropriate
test. This is because under this standard, courts are asked to relate the
consequence with a needed benefit, instead of relating the consequence with
the crime committed. By conflating these considerations, the ULC may

148. Love, supra note 4, at 262.
149. Id. (citing UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION Act §10(a) (2010)).
150. Id. at 263 (quoting Unif. Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act §10(b)(1)-(2)
(2010)).
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actually be granting more relief than necessary to meet the ends of justice.151
Additionally, like the ABA approach, the ULC approach provides no
guidance for the consideration of civil consequences. Therefore, the ULC
approach is not the ultimate solution.
4. The Model Penal Code’s Approach
In a proposal approved by the American Law Institute in 2014, the
Model Penal Code (“MPC”) outlines its approach to how courts should
handle collateral consequences.152 According to this proposal, courts would
first be made aware of all of the applicable legislative consequences by their
jurisdiction’s sentencing commission.153 Then the court would have
authority over which penalties or regulations applied and which were not
necessary.154 In deciding which legislative consequences should apply and
which should not, the MPC correctly proposes a kind of rational relation
test.155 Unlike the test proposed by the ULC, the MPC test instructs courts
to only authorize legislative consequences that are closely related to the
crime committed.
At this point, it appears the MPC has formed the most justice-driven
solution to this issue. Unlike the other approaches,156 courts would be made
aware of all applicable legislative consequences at the beginning of
sentencing and would be able to consider them at that time. Furthermore,
under this approach, only the appropriate legislative consequences would
be considered. However, there are still cracks in this proposal.
Under this approach, legislative consequences become “as much a part of
the court’s sentencing function as a fine or prison term.”157 This should not
be the case. The mandatory penalties that attach at conviction were enacted
by the Legislature. These were put in place to be in addition to and separate
from sentences crafted by courts. However, because of their punitive nature,
151. This concept is fairly confusing. Because of this, it will be discussed at greater length
in the next section of this Note.
152. Love, supra note 4, at 265. This approach also contains proposals of how courts
should approach granting relief from collateral consequences after sentencing. Id. at 266-70.
However, for the purposes of this Note, only the proposal as to how courts should consider
collateral consequences at sentencing will be discussed.
153. Id. at 265.
154. Id. at 266.
155. Id. at 276.
156. Id. at 260-64 (discussing the Uniform Law Commission’s approach that allows
courts to grant relief from legislative consequences only after the defendant has petitioned
the court to do so).
157. Id. at 272.
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these penalties should require some judicial evaluation before they attach to
a convicted person. The MPC proposal has two problems stemming from
this mixing of the powers. First, if these legislative consequences become
part of the sentence itself, the Judiciary takes away at least some of the
function of the Legislature. Second, the well-established judicial sentencing
system loses part of its usefulness. These legislative consequences should
not serve as punishment imposed by a court. Rather, these penalties should
be imposed as a matter of law while being governed by the sentencing
courts to ensure only the appropriate ones are imposed. Therefore, the
MPC approach fails to determine exactly how it is appropriate for courts to
consider collateral consequences.
IV. THE SOLUTION
In his dissenting opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky, Justice Scalia explained
the issue with courts taking the wheel from the Legislature. He explained
that the “[L]egislat[ure] . . . could solve the problems . . . in a more precise
and targeted fashion.”158 This is especially applicable here. Specifically, in
regards to legislative collateral consequences, courts may not influence their
applicability or severity. Because of this, courts are varying severely from
sentencing guidelines in order to offset the effects of such legislative
penalties. As discussed earlier, even if courts did have the authority to
choose which legislative consequences applied, there is still a problem with
considering these penalties as part of the sentence. A permanent solution
requires legislative action.
The Legislature should give the courts discretion (much like that granted
by the MPC) over which legislative consequences apply. However, this
legislation should specify that these penalties are still imposed as a matter of
law and not as a judicial sentence. In this way, the separation of powers is
maintained while ensuring that individuals are not being over-sentenced.
By allowing the Legislature to maintain control over these statutes and
regulations, the courts will remain safe from criticism and the Legislature
will be able to perfect some of its already proven legislation.
If the Legislature were to give courts this discretion, the ball would once
again be in the Judiciary’s court. In determining which penalties,

158. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 392 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also United
States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 198 (“While consideration of the collateral
consequences . . . should be part of a sentencing judge’s calculus in arriving at a just
punishment, it does nothing, of course, to mitigate the fact that those consequences will still
attach. It is for Congress and the states’ legislatures to determine whether the plethora of
post-sentence punishments imposed upon felons is truly warranted . . . .”).
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regulations, or sanctions to apply, courts could use the established
considerations of fairness and policy they use to determine appropriate
sentences.159 The MPC proposed the correct test to be used by courts in
determining which legislative consequences should apply and which should
not. This Note also proposes that a simple rational basis test should be used
by courts in determining which legislative consequences should be allowed
or disallowed.
For instance, if a person opens another person’s mail, he is guilty of the
federal offense of obstruction of correspondence.160 Because that is a felony,
the guilty party would no longer be able to own a firearm in many states. If
a court were granted discretion by the legislature to conduct a rational
relation test under circumstances like these, it could be determined that
there is no rational relation between the (likely) non-violent crime of
obstruction of correspondence and the right to own a firearm. Therefore,
that collateral consequence could be rendered inapplicable by the
sentencing court. Conversely, if the court were to review a legislative
consequence that held that the felon could no longer find employment at a
postal office, it would likely be determined that there is a strong rational
relation between the consequence and the crime.
Using this rational relation test results in a different result than the test
proposed by the ULC. Consider another example, instead applying the ULC
test. A party is convicted of a violent crime felony. As in the case of
obstruction of correspondence, this party may no longer own a firearm in
many states. However, this party previously worked as a private body guard;
a job that required the usage of a firearm. Under the ULC test, a court might
find that, because the legislative consequence detrimentally affects the
party’s ability to maintain his employment, that legislative consequence
should not apply. However, that result does not serve one of the most
fundamental goals of justice: incapacitation. A person convicted of a violent
felony could very well not be trusted with an instrument that could be used
to cause further violent harm. Under the correct rational relation test, this
distortion would not occur.
Of course, the rational relation test proposed above should not be the
only analysis conducted by sentencing courts. In order to keep a clear line
between the court’s sentence and the legislative consequences, courts should
strive to determine the legislative intent of each applicable statute or

159. For instance, courts could use 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to help establish the purpose of
each legislative consequence.
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (1994).
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regulation. In so doing, the courts could accomplish both the goals of
sentencing and of the legislation.
As for civil consequences, sentencing courts should consider them
sparingly and cautiously. This Note proposes that a test similar to the one
proposed by the ULC may be more appropriately applied to civil
consequences. While comparing legislative consequences to a convicted
person’s employment, education, or other personal benefits may be
inappropriate, it may be just the right test for civil consequences. If courts,
in their judicial discretion, conducted a rational relation test between civil
consequences and their effect on an individual’s “employment, education,
housing, public benefits, or occupational licensing,” the result would be less
speculative than the courts’ current approach. Overall, however, civil
consequences are the real culprits in middle class sentencing, and as such
they should be considered largely non-justiciable.
Unfortunately, legislative action like what is needed here does not
happen overnight. Especially considering the recentness of the unrest in the
justice system, it may be quite a while before the Legislature takes notice of
this pressing issue. So, what should be done in the mean time? Should
collateral consequences continue to haunt ex-offenders well after they have
completed their sentence? This Note proposes that they should not. The
Nesbeth court did not take the ideal approach in addressing this issue.
However, considering the current state of case law and stagnant character of
legislative consequences, perhaps their approach was the most appropriate
at the time. After considering the civil and legislative collateral
consequences, along with the factors and sentencing goals under § 3553(a),
the Nesbeth court did the only thing they had the power to do: shape the
sentence. It is true that the court may have considered some impermissible
civil consequences; however, in the end, the court, in its judicial experience,
took a “means to an end” approach that brought about a just sentence.
V. CONCLUSION
Sentencing courts have a responsibility to serve justice when delivering a
sentence. According to history and § 3553(a), the goals of sentencing are
punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and reintegration.
Collateral consequences frustrate these purposes by making it nearly
impossible for ex-offenders to truly be rehabilitated and reintegrate into
society. With ex-offenders facing a range of stigmas and disabilities as the
result of a criminal conviction every day, it is no wonder courts see so many
familiar faces being led through their halls.
In order to serve the purposes of justice, courts must consider collateral
consequences in the sentencing stage. What consequences are appropriate
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to be considered must be evaluated to determine that discrimination is
avoided while tailor-made sentences are imposed. Additionally, the manner
in which these consequences are permitted to influence sentencing should
be carefully controlled. The best way to ensure offenders are not being over
sentenced is for the Legislature to grant the sentencing courts some
discretion over which legislative consequences should be imposed and
which are unnecessary to serve the goals of sentencing and of the
legislation.
In the end, U.S. v. Nesbeth represents a clear step in the right direction.
The court may not have figured out the perfect path to take, but it used
what powers it had to ensure a just sentence was delivered. Collateral
consequences represent just another speed bump on the road to perfecting
the greatest justice system in the world. If courts, like the one in Nesbeth,
continue to take such care in guaranteeing that fairness and justice guide
their decisions, there should be no doubt that the issue of collateral
consequences and their role in sentencing will someday be just another
American success story.

